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THE ADEQUACY OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE LAW
by
Cooper H. Wayman, * Diana C. Dutton* * and Cassandra Dunn***
HE National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) 1 has thrust
major responsibilities and sensitivities upon industry, government, and
the general public. The obvious practical intent of NEPA as culled from
the legislative history was to instill in each federal agency an awareness of
concern for preservation of the environment. 2  Although the Act is still in
its infancy, its protectorate-type mandate should have been invoked hun-
dreds of years ago. There is nothing novel about pollution.3
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142 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
2 S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 13-15 (1969).
3 Pollution was recognized as early as 1388:
Also, for that so much dung and other filth of the garbage and entrails as
well of beasts killed, as of other corruptions, be cast and put in ditches,
rivers and other waters, and also many other places within, about, and
nigh unto divers cities, boroughs, and towns of the realm, and the suburbs
of them, that the air there is greatly corrupt and infect, and many maladies
and other intolerable diseases do daily happen, as well to the inhabitants
and those that are conversant in the said cities, boroughs, towns and sub-
burbs, as to others repairing and traveling thither, to the great annoyance,
damage, and peril of the inhabitants dwellers, repairers, and travellers
aforesaid: it is accorded and assented, that proclamation be made as well
in the city of London, as in other cities, boroughs, and towns, throughout
the realm where it shall be needful, as well within franchises as without,
that all they which have cast and laid such annoyances, dung, garbages,
entrails and other ordure in ditches, rivers, waters, and other places afore-
said, shall cause them utterly to be removed, avoided, and carried away
betwixt this and the feast of Saint Michael next ensuing after the end of
this present parliament, every one upon pain to lose and to forfeit to our
lord the King twenty pounds; and that the mayors and bailiffs of every
such city, borough, and town, and also the bailiffs of franchises shall
compel the same to be done upon like pain. And if any feel himself
grieved, that this be not perfected in manner aforesaid, and will there-
upon complain to the chancellor after the said feast of Saint Michael, he
shall have a writ to cause him of whom he will so complain to come into
the chancery, there to shew why the said penalty should not be levied
of him. And moreover proclamation shall be made, as well in the said
city of London, as in other cities, boroughs, and towns as aforesaid, that
none of what condition soever he be, cause to be cast or thrown from
henceforth any such annoyance, garbage, dung, entrails, nor any other
ordure into the ditches, rivers, waters, and other places aforesaid; and
if any so do, he shall be called by writ before the chancellor, at his suit
that will complain; and if he be found guilty, he shall be punished ac-
cording to the discretion of the chancellor.
12 Rich. 2, c. 13 (1388), reprinted in 58 A.B.A.J. 1303 (1972).
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS
No one really knows what NEPA stands for. It is basically a policy act
to guide the agency decision-making process. It has been colored with
many connotations. Various legal commentators have embellished the Act
with some perceptive comments. "In form, the National Environmental
Policy Act is a statute; in spirit a constitution . . . .-4 "In sum, it does
not seem farfetched to suggest that the National Environmental Policy Act
could well become our Environmental Bill of Rights." 5
NEPA is believed one of the best governmental self-regulating devices
to become law, but it is still in the judicial "laboratory" state with its awk-
ward-looking bumps becoming a succinct tool with a very sharp cutting
edge. With all due deference to the keenness with which our Congressmen
have envisaged NEPA, attorneys, administrative agencies, and the judiciary
have shared some formidable headaches. One area that is anything but
resolved involves the adequacy of an impact statement. Agencies are left
with a very wide discretion as to the necessity of preparing an environ-
mental impact statement (EIS) and how detailed the statement must be.
This Article attempts to evaluate the present status of what elements com-
promise an EIS; how definitive it must be; whether or not it is necessary
at all; whether or not NEPA is a substantive mandate or merely procedural;
how NEPA should be considered in segments of projects and multi-agency
projects; and the spin-off of NEPA into state laws.
I. ELEMENTS OF AN EIS
The preparation of an EIS is a highly technical process involving the
evaluation of a policy together with its environmental impact. Impractical
in terms of a cost-benefit analysis, the most elegant approach to the EIS
problem was recently promulgated.0 Other technical and practical guides
in the preparation of an EIS are available.
7
Drafting a proper impact statement involves much more than filling in
the blanks of a government form. NEPA statements can and do vary, from
relatively short and simple analyses of the environmental effects of smaller
projects to complex multi-volume works for projects of multi-billion dollar
dimensions. In Sierra Club v. Froehlke8 the district court reviewed four
major areas that must always be considered when drafting an EIS. First,
as to detail, "[t]he statement should gather into one place the discussion
of environmental impacts and alternatives so that it serves as a comprehen-
4 Hanks & Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 230, 245 (1970).
5 Id. at 269. See also Note, The National Environmental Policy Act: A Sheep
in Wolf's Clothing, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 139 (1970); Note, NEPA: Full of Sound
and Fury .. . ?, 6 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 116 (1971).
6 UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCULAR No. 645, A PROCEDURE FOR
EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT (1971).
7 Geise, National Environmental Policy Act: Federal Guidelines, in THE ROCKY
MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INSTITUTE 3-2 to
-22 (1972); Hampton, Practical Considerations in Preparing Environmental Impact
Statements (EIS), in OKLAHOMA CENTER FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, A
PRACTICAL LOOK AT ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 165-71 (1973).
8 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
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sive document upon which responsible agency officials and others might
rely in making the required balance between environmental and non-environ-
mental factors." An impact statement should be "sufficiently detailed so
that, if challenged, the courts will not be left to guess as to what is involved
and whether the requirements of NEPA have been met."'10 Second, as to
objectivity, the statement must, at a minimum, reflect a good faith effort
to comply with provisions of NEPA. This will automatically preclude con-
sciously slanted or biased impact statements with attempts at intentional
misrepresentation." Third, an impact statement must be written in lan-
guage understandable to non-technical minds and at the same time con-
tain enough scientific reasoning to alert specialists to particulars within the
field of their expertise. 12  Finally, the statement must discuss the alterna-
tives to the proposed policy13 in order "to ensure that each agency decision-
maker has before him and takes into proper account all possible approaches
to a particular project (including total abandonment of the project) which
would alter the environmental impact and the cost-benefit balance."'1 4  Al-
though agencies are to consider alternatives to the fullest extent possible,
the search for appropriate alternatives need not be exhaustive, speculative,
or remote. 15 Rather, an agency only needs to consider those alternatives
that are reasonably available,' 6 always keeping in mind that the discus-
sions and considerations of alternatives cannot be merely superficial but
must be thoroughly explored.17
An additional element that must be included in an EIS is a discussion of
the effect that a project will have on the cost-benefit ratio (B/C ratio).
Since the purpose of an impact statement is to advise Congress of all en-
vironmental consequences of a proposed action, it should contain a section
9 Id. at 1341; see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d
827, 833-35 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449
F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of
Eng'rs, 348 F. Supp. 916, 931-33 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
10 359 F. Supp. at 1342; see Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1971).
11359 F. Supp. at 1342; see Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of
Eng'rs, 342 F. Supp. 1211, 1214 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).12 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 348 F. Supp. 916, 933
(N.D. Miss. 1972). EPA Interim Reg. § 6.32, 38 Fed. Reg. 1700 (1973), requires
that "[s]tatements shall not be drafted in a style which requires extensive scientific or
technical expertise to comprehend and evaluate the environmental impact of an Agency
action."
'3 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(C)(iii), 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(C)(iii) (1970), provides that "all agencies of the Federal government shall
... include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on . . . alternatives to the pro-
posed action . . . ." The Act further requires that "all agencies of the Federal
government shall . . . study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recom-
mended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning
alternative uses of available resources ...... Id. § 102(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 4332-(2) (D) (1970).
14 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
15 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 836-38 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
16 Id. at 834.
17 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 165, 167(D.D.C. 1971).
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that initially explains how the benefits and costs are calculated and then de-
tails which items are included as a benefit or cost and the valuation of each.
The exact value of the B/C ratio, with respect to the proceedings brought
under NEPA, is important only to ascertain whether the environmental fac-
tors have been properly and adequately considered. The value of the
B/C ratio to the courts, therefore, is not as a basis for the disposition of an
action brought under NEPA, but merely as an aid to the court in its task of
determining whether all factors have been taken into account, after which
the court may rule on whether -the agency's decision to proceed was arbi-
trary and capricious. To calculate the B/C ratio under NEPA, the agency
proposing the action must take account of "the total effect of the action not
only upon the environment, but also upon local and state governments and
any other groups that might be adversely affected.' 8 Failure to quantify
each environmental effect will not, in itself, render an EIS deficient, be-
cause it is recognized that such values cannot be calculated.19  An EIS,
however, must note that there is a deficiency present to comply with NEPA.
Thus, summing up, it is apparent that the B/C ratio analysis required by
NEPA is to aid the courts in determining whether all benefits and costs of
projects have been considered, but is not, in itself, a determining factor of
compliance with the NEPA.
Any number of omissions or agency miscalculations can taint a final
impact statement. Examples include the failure to follow agency regula-
tions in preparing the statement; 20 regarding the substance of the statement
itself, the failure to set forth all known environmental impacts 21 or unavoid-
able adverse effects; 22 the failure to mention and explore all alternatives
and the environmental impacts of these alternatives, 23 whether or not under
agency control;24 the failure to discuss irreversible and irretrievable commit-
ments of resources; 25 and the failure to discuss future plans emanating
from the proposed action.26 Additionally, it might be fatal to fail to consult
all appropriate agencies specified by NEPA,27 to fail to include responsible
18 Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404, 413-14 (W.D. Va. 1973).
19 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 758 (E.D.
Ark. 1971).
20 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 756-57
(E.D. Ark. 1971); cf. Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 349 F. Supp. 696
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
21 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 758
(E.D. Ark. 1971).
22 Id.; cf. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Schlesinger, 404 U.S. 917,
920-30 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
23 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332-
(2)(C) (1970); see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d
827 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F.
Supp. 749, 761-62 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
24 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834-35 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
25 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 758(E.D. Ark. 1971). See Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 349 F. Supp.
696, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d
1109, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
26 Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 423-24 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).
27 Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 788 (D.C.
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comments in the report,28 or to fail to show that these comments ac-
companied the proposal through the agency review process. 29 Failure to
include an agency comment post-dating the final statement has been noted 30
and the failure to circulate subsequent addendum to the final statement
has been declared improper.3 ' All of these matters have received atten-
tion by courts in deciding whether the agency has produced a "detailed
statement"3 2 or whether it has failed in some respect. 83
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals shed some light on
some of these pitfalls in Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v.
Seaborg34 when it admonished the Atomic Energy Commission to include
the full range of responsible opinion in the comments received concerning
the environmental impact of an underground nuclear explosion on Am-
chitka Island in the Aleutians:
When, as here, the issue of procedure relates to the sufficiency of the
presentation in the statement, the court is not to rule on the relative
merits of competing scientific opinion. Its function is only to assure
that the statement sets forth the opposing scientific views, and does not
take the arbitrary and impermissible approach of completely omitting
from the statement, and hence from the focus that the statement was
intended to provide for the deciding officials, any reference whatever
to the existence of responsible scientific opinions concerning possible
adverse environmental effects. Only responsible opposing views need
be included and hence there is room for discretion on the part of the of-
ficials preparing the statement; but there is no room for an assumption
that their determination is conclusive. The agency need not set forth
at full length views with which it disagrees, all that is required is a
meaningful reference that identifies the problem at hand for the respon-
sible official. The agency, of course, is not foreclosed from noting in
the statement that it accepts certain contentions or rejects others.35
Another opinion by the same circuit court dealt at length with another
of the pitfalls: the degree to which the statement must consider alternatives
Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 758
(E.D. Ark. 1971); cf. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463,
481 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).
28 Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 787 (D.C.
Cir. 1971; Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749,
758 (E.D. Ark. 1971); cf. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Schlesinger,
404 U.S. 917, 920-30 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
29 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 758
(E.D. Ark. 1971; cf. National Forest Preservation Group v. Butz, 343 F. Supp. 696 (D.
Mont. 1972).
30 Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 787 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
31 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 170 (D.D.C.
1972).
32 Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of
Eng'rs, 348 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin,
325 F. Supp. 1401 (D.D.C. 1971).
33 National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Brooks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Wash.), rev'd 460 F.2d 1193 (9th
Cir. 1972); Lathan v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 262 (W.D. Wash. 1972); Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engr's, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).3 4 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
35 Id. at 787.
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to the proposed action. In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Morton36 the court referred to the EIS as "the environmental source ma-
terial for . . . the making of relevant decisions"' 37 which should include
an-evaluation of the proposal and its alternatives:
A sound construction of NEPA . . .requires a presentation of the
environmental risks incident to reasonable alternative courses of action.
The agency may limit its discussion of environmental impact to a brief
statement, when that is the case, that the alternative course involves no
effect on the environment, or that their effect, briefly described, is
simply not significant. A rule of reason is implicit in this aspect of the
law as it is in the requirement' that the agency provide a statement con-
cerning those opposing views that are responsible.38
The rationale for this construction is that "[t]he impact statement is not
only for the exposition of the thinking of the agency, but also for the guid-
ance of these ultimate decision-makers, and must provide them with the
environmental effects of both the proposal and the alternatives, for their
consideration along with the various other elements of the public interest. ' ' 3
Therefore, only the demonstrably speculative, presently unfeasible, or un-
reasonably remote alternatives can be given short shrift or excluded al-
together. 40
Due to the generality of NEPA, it is not surprising that the courts have
had numerous occasions to interpret it, especially section 102. "The
lack of specificity in NEPA's environmental mandate has cast upon courts
the responsibility for formulating more precise definitions of NEPA's re-
quirements and for determining the legislation's effect on administrative au-
thority and conduct. '4 1 Accordingly, it is not possible to predict definitely
what a court will require an impact statement to include to be acceptable
on judicial review. If, however, each of the factors discussed in the previ-
ous pages are considered when preparing an EIS, and each of the five spec-
ified tlements of section 102(2) (C) 42 are included, the EIS should with-
stand review in every circuit, regardless of whether the court has adopted
the more lenient procedural review or the rigors of a substantive review.
II. AGENCY DECISION ON PREPARATION OF EIS VERSUS
NEGATIVE DECLARATION
A recurring question for the courts is whether or not an administrative
or quasi-regulatory agency must prepare an EIS at all. In the alternative
an agency may make a discretionary determination to file a so-called "nega-
tive declaration." This section will explore some of the decisions that bear
36 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
37d. at 833.
38 Id. at 834.
39 ld. at 835.
40 Id. at 834-38.
41 Note, Evolving Judicial Standards Under the National Environmental Policy Act
and the Challenge of the Alaska Pipeline, 81 YALE L.J. 1592 (1972).
42 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
19731
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
upon this question and some guidelines that influence the agency decision-
making process.
NEPA requires all agencies of the federal government to "include in
every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other ma-
jor Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human en-
vironment, a detailed statement by the responsible officials . . ." concern-
ing the environmental aspects and effects of the action and proposing feasible
alternatives to the action.43  "There is no doubt that the Act contemplates
some agency action which does not require this impact statement," pro-
vided the action is not a major federal -action or has so little effect on the
environment as to be insignificant. 44 However, as former Council on Environ-
mental Quality (CEQ) Chairman Train has observe, "You cannot define how
significant is significant, or how big is major, or how substantial is sub-
stantial. These are qualitative, subjective terms that do not lend them-
selves to legal definition."' 45  Nevertheless, the CEQ has attempted to
list criteria for the definition of "actions. ''48  These CEQ Guidelines,
first issued in 1971 and revised in 1973, for agencies to follow in imple-
menting NEPA, although not having the force of law, do have persuasive
value. 47 For this reason, the CEQ makes no attempt at furnishing en-
forcement methods, nor does it categorically mandate that agencies follow
a specific procedure; rather, it couches its directives in terms of what an
agency should consider. The CEQ has recognized that federal agencies
have vastly differing functions and programs.4 Therefore, federal agencies
whose programs are generally carried out by state and local governments,
e.g., HUD, will require entirely different and more sophisticated regula-
tions than will agencies that have direct program implementations. Accord-
ingly, the procedures promulgated by different agencies show a wide range
of variation in approaching implementation, 49 both from the perspective
of agency attitude and the care and preparation of their procedures.50  EPA
regulations have encouraged both press releases and public participation
431 d.
44 Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972);
see Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783 (D. Me 1972); Echo Park
Residents Comm. v. Romney, 3 ENVIR. REP.-CAS. 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
45 Hearings on the Administration of the National Environmental Policy Act Before
the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1970).46 See CEQ Guidelines § 1500.5(a), 38 Fed. Reg. 20,551 (1973).
47 See generally Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 391 (1971).
48 See Hearings on the First Annual Environmental Quality Report Before the
Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
49Compare GSA Procedures, 36 Fed. Reg. 23,702 (1971), which take a rather
exclusionary approach, with HEW Procedures, 36 Fed. Reg. 23,676 (1971), which
encourage a more positive and energetic role for HEW.
50 Indicative of agency attitude is the statement of purpose in promulgating regula-
tions. It is interesting to note how the agency views its duties and how it perceives
the objectives and the results of complying procedurally with NEPA. Other indicators
of agency attitude may be found in the degree to which the public is encouraged to
partake in environmental analysis. See, e.g., Forest Service Guidelines § 8413.22, 38
Fed. Reg. 31,930 (1973), where it was established that draft environmental statements
are to be the basis for encouraging public action; HEW Procedures, 36 Fed. Reg.
23,676 (1971), where it was established that the agency should encourage press
releases on environmental matters.
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using the draft environmental statements. 51 Furthermore, courts have sought
to ensure that NEPA mandates are fully complied with, and thus, have
laid down some of their own minimum requirements for agency pro-
cedures.
The decision to prepare and file an EIS depends upon the determina-
tion of two autonomous criteria: whether a major federal action is present,
and whether this action will significantly affect the environment. These
two concepts are distinct, and "the responsible federal agency has the au-
thority to make its own threshold determination as to each in deciding whether
an impact statement is necessary."'5 2  The following discussion deals with
three areas of interpretation of each of these two elements considered in
turn. First, the CEQ Guidelines are outlined; second, the agency regulations
are discussed, giving special consideration to those adopted by the EPA de-
limiting what is considered to fall into each category; and finally, the ju-
dicial gloss on the elements is examined.
A. Major Federal Action
CEQ Guidelines. The CEQ Guidelines require each administrative
agency to adopt its own regulations designed to determine when a major
federal action is being undertaken.5 3 According to the CEQ, the statutory
clause "major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment" is to be construed by agencies with a view to the overall,
cumulative impact of the specific action proposed being presently consid-
ered and of further actions contemplated. Even if an action is localized
in its nature, a statement must be prepared if there is a potential that it will
significantly affect the environment. According to these guidelines, all
proposed actions whose environmental impact is likely to be highly con-
troversial must be accompanied by an impact statement.
The CEQ goes on to point out that in considering what elements will con-
stitute a major action, agencies should bear in mind that their decision con-
cerning the necessity of submitting an impact statement for a project or
complex of projects should reflect not merely the individual effect of the
action, but also the cumulative effect that may make it environmentally un-
desirable. This may occur, for example, when one or more agencies con-
tribute to a project resources that are individually minor but collectively
major. When one decision involving a limited amount of money is a prece-
dent for action in further projects or represents a decision in principle about
a future major course of action, or when a group of federal agencies indi-
vidually makes decisions about partial aspects of a federal action, the lead
agency in such projects must prepare an EIS if it is reasonable to antici-
pate a cumulative impact on the environment from federal action. 54
51 EPA Interim Regs., 38 Fed. Reg. 1696 (1973).
52 Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990
(1972).
53 CEQ Guidelines § 1500.3(a), 38 Fed. Reg. 20,551 (1973).
54 Lead agency refers to the federal agency that has primary authority for committing
the federal government to a course of action with significant environmental impact.
1973]
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EPA Regulations. Due to the variety of federal actions, agencies have
approached the determination of which are major in a number of ways.
Some agencies with extremely broad functions have deferred to the general
inclusiveness of the CEQ Guidelines, 5 while other agencies with equally
broad functions have gone one step further and have made the decision to
resolve all doubts in favor of discussion of impact.5" Agencies with nar-
rower functions, however, have recognized that procedural regulations more
readily lend themselves to particularization. The Forest Service, for ex-
ample, has taken the position that the responsible official must use good
judgment in determining when an impact statement is necessary and has
provided seven specific categories of possible economic effects, as well as
a sample listing of ecological situations that may be affected.5 7  HEW has
gone even further than the Forest Service, requiring that the determination
of whether to file an EIS be based not solely on the dollar and physical
size of the project but also on the potential effect on the environment of
the community. 58  HEW regulations list many points of comparison be-
tween the proposed project and its ecological effect. This approach is
also taken by the Department of Transportation59 and the Federal Highway
Administration.60
The EPA regulations on the subject of major federal action on their face
include all agency actions and actions of other parties directly or indirectly
supported by the agency unless expressly exempted. 01 The major exemp-
tions are regulatory activities, normal personnel actions, legislative pro-
posals originating in another agency, legislative proposals not relating to
or affecting the matters within EPA's primary areas of responsibility, and
contracts for consulting services and administrative procurement. Of these,
only the latter two raise additional problems.62 A contract for consulting
services could involve activities having an environmental impact if, for ex-
ample, a contractor utilizes a particular process for performing. However,
since the exemption only applies to the actual decision to employ the con-
tractor, it could not be extended to exempt utilization of the process.
Administrative procurement could also conceivably have environmental ef-
fect, for example, in purchasing supplies not subject to recycling.
Judicial Interpretation. Courts have recognized the necessity for agency ex-
pertise in deciding whether an action is major and whether it significantly
As necessary, the CEQ has established that it will assist in resolving conflicts concerning
lead agency determination. See also Humphreys, NEPA and Multi-Agency Actions-
Is the "Lead Agency" Concept Valid?, 6 NAT. REs. LAW. 257 (1973).
55 See, e.g., GSA Procedures, 36 Fed. Reg. 23,702 (1971).56 See, e.g., USDA Guidelines, 38 Fed. Reg. 31,935 (1973).
57 Forest Service Guidelines §§ 8411, 8411.41, 8411.43, 38 Fed. Reg. 31,923-24
(1973).
58 HEW Procedures § 20-15-40(A), 36 Fed. Reg. 23,677-78 (1971).
59 Dept. of Transp. Procedures, 38 Fed. Reg. 30,215 (1973).60 Fed. Hwy. Admin. Regs., 38 Fed. Reg. 30,192 (1973).
61 EPA Interim Regs. § 6.13(b), 38 Fed. Reg. 1697 (1973).
62 Personnel actions may have an environmental impact if they result in a substantial
expansion of the work force at a federal facility, thus increasing traffic, waste and
population density. This increment, however, would involve a separate, identifiable
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affects the quality of the human environment, and they will generally over-
turn an agency decision only if it is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
agency discretion. 63 But in Scherr v. Volpe64 the court rejected this view
on the basis that NEPA is a flat command to federal agencies. Thus,
while an agency must have the first opportunity to decide what is expected
of it, "when its failure is then challenged, it is the court which must con-
strue the statutory standards . . . and, having construed them, then apply
them to the particular project .... "65
The courts have addressed the major federal action requirement in pri-
vate injunction suits. In the area of administrative grants, numerous fed-
erally supported activities have been subjected to the impact statement re-
quirement. A large blanket grant, even when only a relatively small por-
tion is used for a project with a potential environmental impact, may be
found to fall under the mandate. In Ely v. Velde,66 because a small por-
tion of a law enforcement assistance grant was allocated by the state to pris-
on construction in an historic area, the court required preparation of an EIS
as a prerequisite to receiving the whole grant. Impact statement require-
ments cannot be avoided by submerging a specific project within a much
larger, ill-defined governmental act such as a huge block grant, nor can
an assessment of the total environmental impact be avoided by subdividing a
project into numerous small parts no one of which is a major federal ac-
tion. As a result, in Named Individual Members of San Antonio Con-
servation Society v. Texas Highway Department67 the court held that each
segment of a highway project must be viewed as an integrated part of the
whole, and that the cost of the entire project is the relevant figure from
which to decide the major federal action issue.
The stage in the development of a project at which federal action be-
comes major also has attracted judicial inquiry. The mere funding of pre-
liminary studies or investigations, for example, does not require an impact
statement, 68 except, of course, when the preliminary studies themselves have
a physical impact. 69 Preliminary steps, however, may be deemed major
actions even without a physical impact if they represent so substantial a
commitment of federal resources that subsequent withdrawal is unlikely.
Condemnation proceedings by state and federal agencies for a federally
funded project have been found to fall within this category. 70
decision to expand that would require its own impact statement, thus removing the
necessity for a second one at the personnel action stage.
68 See Echo Park v. Romney, 3 ENVIR. REP.-CAs. 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
64 336 F. Supp. 886 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
65 Id. at 888. See also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F.
Supp. 356, 366 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
66451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
67 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971).
68 Northeast Area Welfare Rights v. Volpe, 2 ENvR. REP.-CAs. 1704 (E.D. Wash.
1971). See also City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1972).
69 West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232
(4th Cir. 1971) (permit for mineral testing held to be a major federal action).
70See Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971); Keith v. Volpe, 4 ENVIR.
REP.-CAs. 1562 (C.D. Cal. 1972); United States v. 247.37 Acres of Land, 3 ENvIR.
REP.-CAS. 1098 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
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The physical dimensions of a federal project have served as a guideline
for determining major action in at least two instances, both involving HUD
projects. In Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney 7l the construction
of a sixteen-story apartment building was found to constitute a major federal
action. The opposite conclusion, however, was reached regarding a sixty-
six unit HUD project in Echo Park v. Romney, 72 although the basis for this
latter decision is not definite because the court treated the necessity of an
impact statement as a matter of administrative discretion subject only to
limitations against abuse. Since the decision in Echo Park, the issue whether
a project is a major federal action has been held to present a matter of
law for the judiciary to determine independently of agency discretion.73
Another district court has determined that an expenditure of $9.3 million
on a sewage plant is a major federal action. 74
Additionally, the cancellation of federal contracts has been subjected to
NEPA requirements. In National Helium Corp. v. Morton75 helium pro-
duction contracts were cancelled. This negative action was held to con-
stitute action sufficiently likely to require an impact statement thereby justi-
fying issuing a preliminary injunction. The potential environmental im-
pact was a loss of a natural resource into the atmosphere. Here, the failure
of the federal government to continue to take advantage of a natural re-
source was found to be within the probable purview of the Act.
Finally, permit and licensing activities also have been subjected to NEPA
requirements. Even a partial operating license for a nuclear reactor, granted
pending NEPA review of an application for a permanent license, has been
found to require its own separate impact statement. 76 Federal permit ac-
tivity of lesser potential dimensions similarly has been subjected to the im-
pact statement mandate. In Kalur v. Resor77 the district court ruled that
grants of Refuse Act permits by the Corps of Engineers require the sub-
mission of impact statements. The court did not distinguish between per-
mits for small discharges of little overall significance and permits for large
discharges, but rather grouped all permit approvals in the major federal ac-
tion category.
The applicability of NEPA to EPA enforcement activities is a problem
indirectly raised by Kalur. Both CEQ Guidelines 78 and EPA regulations 79
exempt enforcement activities from the impact statement requirements; but
the decision in Kalur casts doubt on this area of the law by voiding the
Corps' regulation that attempted to exclude some permits from NEPA cov-
erage.
71 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971).
72 3 ENVIR. REP.-CAs. 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
73 Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 886 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
74 Mountain View Improvement Ass'n v. Fri, Civil No. 10171 (D.N.M., filed June
22, 1973).
75 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971).
76 Izaak Walton League v. Schlesinger, 337 F. Supp. 287 (D.D.C. 1971) (opera-
tion of nuclear reactor at 50% capacity involved a highly controversial issue requiring
a statement regardless of the magnitude of the action).
77 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971).
78 38 Fed. Reg. 20,551 (1973).
79 EPA Interim Regs. § 6.13, 38 Fed. Reg. 1697 (1973).
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B. Significant Environmental Effect
Once the major federal action issue has been affirmatively resolved, the
second prong of NEPA statutory language comes into play. A determina-
tion of whether there is a "significant environmental effect" is a critical ju-
risdictional requirement for the application of NEPA's impact statement
mandate.
CEQ Guidelines. NEPA indicates a broad range of significant effects in-
cluding those that degrade the quality, curtail the range of beneficial uses,
or work to the long-term disadvantage of the environment.80 Additionally,
CEQ Guidelines provide that "[s]ignificant effects can also include ac-
tions which may have both beneficial and detrimental effects, even if on bal-
ance the agency believes that the effect will be beneficial." 8' Thus, an im-
pact statement will be required if an action will degrade the environment,
curtail the range of beneficial uses, or have both beneficial and detrimental
effects. The first factor, the degrading of the environment, obviously is
the main thrust of NEPA and self-explanatory; but the other elements
bear close scrutiny. Even uses that would generally be considered bene-
ficial for a particular site, i.e., a playground, will require an impact state-
ment if other beneficial uses, such as agriculture, are curtailed. The con-
struction of a playground requires the irreversible commitment of the site to
that use, precluding all other uses.8 2
EPA Regulations. Agency regulations establish some standards for deter-
mining significance of effect. In response to the CEQ model, consideration
must be given to both beneficial and adverse effects. 83  Even possible
temporary effects, such as damage during construction, are included as
significant. Individually small, but cumulatively large or precedent-setting
actions are also treated.8 4
Under EPA regulations an initial, thorough study of activities and pro-
posed or recommended agency actions, called an "environmental review,"
is always required for the purpose of determining whether a significant
impact is anticipated and an environmental impact statement required.
8 5
A significant effect on the quality of the human environment encompasses
both adverse and beneficial effects and includes environmental consequences
of both a primary and secondary nature; but primary effects should not be
given greater consideration than secondary effects.86 An impact statement
should be prepared when the project is likely to be or is highly contro-
80 National Environmental Policy Act § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
81 CEQ Guidelines § 1500.6(b), 38 Fed. Reg. 20,551 (1973).
82 See EPA Interim Regs. § 6.32(f), 38 Fed. Reg. 1700 (1973).
83 Id. § 6.20, 38 Fed. Reg. 1698 (1973). See Howard v. EPA, 4 ENvrx. REP.-CAS.
1731 (W.D. Va. 1972) (impact statement not required for sewage plant construction that
decreases present pollution levels).
84 EPA Interim Regs. § 6.20(a)(3), 38 Fed. Reg. 1698 (1973).85Id. § 6.21, 38 Fed. Reg. 1698 (1973).
86 Id. § 6.20, 38 Fed. Reg. 1698 (1973).
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versial, regardless of any measurement of effect.87 The regulations provide
further that, if the environmental assessment indicates no significant impact
upon the quality of the human environment by the proposed action, a
"negative declaration" to that effect shall be prepared and circulated by the
EPA, and an "environmental impact appraisal" supporting the negative
declaration and describing the proposed activity and its impact shall be
prepared and kept on record by the EPA.88
The EPA regulations on impact statements for waste water treatment
plants depend upon more easily identifiable criteria. 9 If the construction of
a plant will affect a residential area by odor or merely visual presence, it
is deemed significant, as is the case when it is planned to be built on public
park lands. Similarly, when substantial population displacement or expan-
sion of service to undeveloped areas is involved, the action is treated as
significant. On the other hand, if the project is located in an area that is
already highly industrial or one in which no new land use is involved, no
impact statement is required.
Judicial Interpretation. The basic form of significant effect that has been
recognized in case law is the immediate physical impact.90 But the cumula-
tive impact with other projects must be considered. "Any action that sub-
stantially affects, beneficially or detrimentally, the depth or course of streams,
plant life, wildlife habitats, fish and wildlife, and the soil and air signifi-
cantly affects the quality of the human environment." 9' 1
Almost any construction that meets the major federal action requirement
will have a significant effect because substantial land will be involved.
The effect of the particular land use has been deemed important by the
courts. Population concentration, increased traffic, interference with views,
and alterations of neighborhood character all have been found to be signifi-
cant under NEPA. 92  Destruction of wildlife habitat has also qualified,98
as have increased noise levels and effects on pedestrian safety.9 4  Addi-
tionally, increases in parking and transportation needs resulting from fed-
erally supported development have also been found significant." And fi-
8 7Id. § 6.20(b), 38 Fed. Reg. 1698 (1973).
88 id. § 6.25, 38 Fed. Reg. 1699 (1973); see Durnford v. Ruckelshaus, 5 ENVIR.
REP.-CAS. 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Howard v. EPA, 4 ENVIR. REP.-CAS. 1731(W.D. Va. 1972).89 EPA Interim Regs. § 6.54, 38 Fed. Reg. 1702 (1973).
90 See Named Individuals of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway
Dept., 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971) (highway construction project); Goose Hollow
Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971) (apartment building);
Gibson v. Ruckelsbaus, 3 ENVIR. REP.-CAS. 1028 (E.D. Tex.), rev'd sub nom. City of
Lufkin v. Gibson, 447 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1971) (sewage disposal plant); Texas Comm.
on Natural Resources v. United States, 1 ENViR. REP.-CAS. 1303 (W.D. Tex.),
vacated, 430 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970) (park project).
91 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356, 367 (E.D.N.C.
1972).
92 Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971).
93 Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. United States, 1 ENVIR. REP.-CAs. 1303
(W.D. Tex.), vacated, 430 F.2d 1315 (1970).94 Nolop v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364 (D.S.D. 1971).
95 Businessmen Affected Severely by Yearly Action Plans, Inc. v. D.C. City
Council, 339 F. Supp. 793 (D.D.C. 1972).
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nally, stream channelization by the Corps of Engineers, increasing the sur-
face of a waterway, 96 and changes in water temperature that affect fish
production97 are also the type of physical changes within the NEPA man-
date. Effects of major physical actions, not in themselves physical altera-
tions, have also received judicial attention. For example, continual pur-
chases of fuel coal produced by strip mining have been subjected to NEPA
review.98
An area of less obvious significant environmental effect is the regulatory
rate increase approval. In Cohen v. Price Commission9 9 a rate increase for
subway and bus fares in New York City had been approved. Plaintiffs
brought suit to enjoin the increase pending a full NEPA review on the
theory that fare increases would expand motor vehicle traffic thereby in-
creasing air pollution in the downtown area. A preliminary injunction was
denied by the court on evidentiary grounds because plaintiffs had failed to
carry the heavy burden of demonstrating the necessary likelihood of suc-
cess. Since disposal of the case was on a burden of proof ground and not
on defendant's counter argument that there was no major federal action or
significant effect, the basis of the decision arguably supports the impropriety
of the defense under the circumstances in the case. Another rate increase
case, involving ICC approval of railroad freight surcharge increases, squarely
presented the issue of the effect of rate increases on the environment. In
Scrap v. United States'0 0 plaintiffs relied on the theory that increased ship-
ping costs would adversely affect the recycling of used goods, thus render-
ing an EIS necessary. The ICC contended that since the increase was only
temporary it was not a major federal action. Defendants also emphasized
in their answer that they had issued a summary statement that concluded
that there were no significant effects. The court rejected the ICC argument
and found that even a temporary action could be major and have a signifi-
cant effect as it did in that case because environmentally beneficial recy-
cling was likely to be affected. The Commission's abbreviated finding of
no effect was deemed inadequate to satisfy even the barest negative dec-
laration form of review.
Although Scrap did not directly involve the effect of transportation rates
on air and traffic conditions, City of New York v. United States,101 relied
on by the court in Scrap, did consider the problem. There, the city sought
to enjoin ICC approval of a railroad line abandonment taken without com-
pliance with NEPA requirements, alleging increased truck traffic and air
pollution as environmental effects. The court remanded to ICC to under-
take NEPA evaluation.
96 Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 331 F. Supp. 925 (D.D.C.
1971).
97 Izaak Walton League v. Schlesinger, 337 F. Supp. 287 (D.D.C. 1971).
08 Natural Resources Defense Council v. TVA, 340 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
rev'd, 459 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972).
99 337 F. Supp. 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
100 4 ENvIR. REP.-CAs. 1312 (D.D.C. 1972).
101 337 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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Although the court in Hanly v. Mitchell'0 2 pointed out that major action
and significant effect are separate criteria to consider, there has been little
judicial experience on negative findings of significant effect once it has been
determined that a major federal action is involved. In Citizens for Reid
State Park v. Laird'03 an injunction was sought against a mock military
amphibious landing on a state park beach. Potential ecological damage al-
leged included trampling mosses, uprooting dune grasses by helicopter prop
wash, and sewage increase from the nine hundred man maneuver. The
court studied the Navy's evaluation of these effects and determined that
there were no long-term effects. Since any damage done would remedy
itself rather than become permanent, injunction was denied.
Judicial application of the significant effects standard has been sensitive
to both immediate and remote physical impacts. The effect of an action
on intangibles, such as neighborhood character, has been considered in de-
termining the significant effect criteria to the same degree as the obvious
tangibles, such as building a highway over an open field or the erection of an
ecologically threatening tall building. 10 4 The most expansive decision tak-
ing into account social effects of construction is Hanly v. Mitchell,105 where
a citizen sued to enjoin construction of a federal prison facility in Foley
Square in New York City. The GSA had prepared a brief statement de-
claring that no adverse effects existed because water, sewage, trash, heat,
and transportation could be handled by existing facilities, no relocation would
be involved, and existing zoning would not need to be altered or chal-
lenged. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not find these
considerations of physical impact to be exhaustively descriptive of environ-
mental effects; therefore, the district court was reversed and the injunction
granted. The effect that was found not to have been considered was the
change in the "living environment of all the families in [the] area."'1 6 In
addition to physical changes that must be considered in making an environ-
mental appraisal to determine whether an EIS is required, "crime, con-
gestion and even [the] availability of drugs" are deemed to be among the
effects that must be studied.10 7 The social impact of constructing various
kinds of facilities, such as hospitals, rehabilitation centers, and police sta-
tions, may alter an otherwise negative finding concerning the necessity of
submitting an EIS. The required degree of an environmental evaluation is
greater than many federal agencies may have imagined necessary because
most have viewed the requirements of NEPA as focusing on plants, wildlife,
and air, water, and solid waste pollution matters. The definition en-
compassed by the word "environment" in NEPA refers to more than merely
biological and physical problems.
102 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972).
103 336 F. Supp. 783 (D. Me. 1972).
10 4 See Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Rommey, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore.
1971).
105 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972).
106 Id. at 646.
107 Id. at 647.
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If any elements requisite for the filing of an EIS pursuant to NEPA are
not found to exist after making an extensive environmental review,' 08 then
rather than order the preparation of an impact statement, the agency, ac-
cording to the EPA regulations, should require the preparation of a nega-
tive declaration, a written announcement prepared subsequent to the review
which is factually defensible, stating that the agency has decided not to
prepare an EIS.'0 9 The drafters of NEPA intended this Act to be a firm
but fluid statement.110
As the courts become more willing to involve judicial machinery with
the problems of the environment, NEPA, especially through the EIS man-
date, will become the significant tool it was intended to be. In light of the
direction that courts are taking, no federal project, major or minor, with a
significant or insignificant effect, is totally free from the all-encompassing
umbrella of NEPA. If an EIS is not determined to be necessary, a similar
statement verifying such a negative determination is still prepared-the
submission of an environmental impact appraisal supporting the negative
declaration. This appraisal actually is an impact evaluation, just as an
EIS, but concludes that no environmental impact will result from the action
at issue. Therefore, in essence, all projects are subjected to the same in-
tense environmental review and required to submit some statement attest-
ing to the result of that review. When it is determined that the project con-
stitutes a major federal action that will significantly affect the quality of the
human environment, then the agency must follow all procedures finally lead-
ing up to the submission of a final EIS; when a negative determination re-
sults, then the agency must still submit an abbreviated EIS accompanying
the filing of a negative declaration."'
108 EPA Interim Regs. § 6.21(a), 38 Fed. Reg. 1698 (1973).
109 Id. § 6.11(e), 38 Fed. Reg. 1697 (1973).
110 Senator Henry Jackson, co-sponsor of the National Environmental Policy Act,
has written, "A national policy for the environment [is] necessary to provide both a
conceptual basis and legal sanction for applying to environmental management the
methods of systems analysis that have demonstrated their value in universities, private
enterprise, and in some areas of government." Jackson, Environmental Policy and
the Congress, 11 NAT. RES. J. 403, 407 (1969).
M The following procedural steps are to be followed in making environmental
appraisals in accordance with EPA Interim Regulations, 38 Fed. Reg. 1696 (1973):
1. Proposed and certain ongoing agency actions shall be subjected to
continuing environmental review, which will determine whether a
significant impact is anticipated from the proposed action. Id. § 6.21.
2. If an environmental review indicates impact will occur, the following
action must take place:
a. Notice of intent, announcing the preparation of a draft impact
statement, shall be issued by the "responsible official." Id. § 6.22.
b. As soon as possible after notice of intent is filed, the draft must be
circulated to interested federal and state agencies. Public hearings
will be held if warranted. Id. § 6.23.
c. A final impact statement must be prepared and distributed. Id. §
6.24.
3. If an environmental review indicates no significant impact will occur,
the following steps should be taken in accordance with id. § 6.25:
a. A negative declaration shall be prepared and circulated in the same
manner as the notice of intent.
b. An environmental impact appraisal shall be on file in the originat-
ing office and available for public inspection.
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III. Is NEPA A SUBSTANTIVE ACT OR MERELY PROCEDURAL?
Because of a lack of adequate legislative history under NEPA there has
been substantial uncertainty as to the reason for imposing compliance on
federal agencies. The question is whether NEPA requires the courts to
scrutinize an EIS substantively or merely evaluate procedural compliance.
"The primary purpose of the [environmental] impact statement is to
compel federal agencies to give serious weight to environmental factors in
makeing [sic] discretionary choices." ' 1 2 It has been recognized that the
role of district courts in reviewing actions of federal agencies under NEPA
has not been clearly enunciated, and different standards have been formu-
lated and followed. 118  It has also been held that in the ultimate weighing
of values, the courts cannot strike the balance but must insist that the appro-
priate administrative officials use the scales prescribed by Congress (in
NEPA) with a scrupulous regard for the importance of the choices pre-
sented.114  Another decision has noted that a court, in reviewing an EIS,
cannot seek to impose unreasonable extremes or inject itself into the
area of discretion of the agencies as to the choice of action to be taken. 11 5
Yet the courts must see that the important legislative purposes to protect
the environment are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the fed-
eral bureaucracy. 110
While agency action is always subject to judicial review as to the com-
pliance with NEPA specified procedures, substantive review is limited. The
form of substantive inquiry was set forth by the Supreme Court in Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,"17 and can be clarified in terms
of three stages: (1) the Secretary's decision is entitled to a presumption of
regularity, although that presumption is not to shield his action from a thor-
ough, probing, and in-depth review; (2) the reviewing court must then de-
termine whether the Secretary has acted within the scope of his authority-
this includes ascertaining: (i) if the actual decision made was arbitrary,
capricious, and abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the
law, (ii) if the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant fac-
tors, and (iii) if there has been a clear error of judgment; (3) finally, de-
spite the fact that the inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful,
the ultimate standard of review is narrow, as the Court is not empowered to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency. This substantive review,
however, is only allowed and not prescribed. There is wide disagreement
among the circuit courts as to when, if ever, an inquiry into the substan-
tive determinations of the agency is justified.
112 Monroe County Conservation Council v. Volpe, 4 ENVIR. REP.-CAS. 1886,
1887 (2d Cir. 1972); see Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg,
463 F.2d 783, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1971); National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650,
656 (10th Cir. 1971); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d
1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
113 Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 5 ENvm. REP.-CAS. 1033, 1060 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
114 Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731, 739 (D. Conn. 1972).
"5 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
116 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
117401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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A. District of Columbia Circuit
An agency decision concerning an environmental impact statement is sub-
ject to very limited substantive review and can be set aside only if the bal-
ance of cost and benefit is arbitrary and capricious or not supported by sub-
stantial evidence. In Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC
the court emphasized this by contrasting a reversal on procedural grounds
as opposed to one on substantive grounds. 118 A Fifth Circuit district court
cited another District of Columbia Circuit decision, Committee for Nuclear
Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg,119 for the proposition that a court can deter-
mine only whether the agency has complied substantially with the proce-
dural requirements of NEPA. 120  The Seaborg court, however, while noting
that its function in substantively reviewing an agency's impact statement
was limited, did not dismiss altogether the possibility of such review.121
An example of substantive review can be found in National Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, where the court reviewed the substance
of an EIS in question and found that "the defendants only superficially dis-
cussed the alternatives listed in their Final Impact Statement, and they
failed to discuss in detail the environmental impacts of the alternatives they
listed in the statement.' 22  Therefore, the project was enjoined pending
preparation of a proper EIS.
The court has also indicated that it will review the factors discussed in
an EIS, recognizing that although agencies are to consider alternatives to the
fullest extent possible, the search for appropriate alternatives need not be
either exhaustive or speculative and remote. The agency need only con-
sider those alternatives that are "reasonably available," yet always realizing
that the discussion and consideration cannot be merely superficial; they
must be thorough' 23
B. Second Circuit
Hanly v. Mitchell124 originally involved only procedural review under
section 102(2)(C) because the federal agency involved contended that
under the circumstances an impact statement was not required, although ul-
timately a short impact statement was submitted. The court first discussed
the procedural aspects and ruled that an impact statement was required.
Then turning to the substantive aspects of the abbreviated EIS that was sub-
mitted, the court found it to be insufficient. The Second Circuit issued a
preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the federal agency for a
proper EIS reflecting a "determination . . . taking account of all relevant
118 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
119 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
120 Pizitz v. Volpe, 4 ENviR. RE.-CAs. 1195 (M.D. Ala.), alf'd, 467 F.2d 208
(5th Cir. 1972).
121 "On the ultimate issue whether a project should be undertaken or not, a matter
involving the assessment and weighing of various factors, the court's function is
limited." 463 F.2d at 786-87.
122 458 F.2d 827, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
128 Id. at 834-38.
124 460 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972).
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factors, of whether the proposed (project) significantly affects the quality
of the human environment.' 125  It is therefore apparent from Hanly that
the Second Circuit is willing to undertake substantive review of an EIS.
In an earlier case, Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC,126
the Second Circuit construed section 101 of NEPA as requiring the same
detailed and exhaustive consideration of environmental factors that had
been required when it remanded the same case to the Federal Power Com-
mission five years earlier. 127 In the earlier case the court made a detailed
substantive review of alternate plans to the project and of the impact of
the project on "the conservation of natural resources, the maintenance of nat-
ural beauty, and the preservation of historic sites.' l28  "The policy state-
ment in Section 101 envisions the very type of full consideration and bal-
ancing of various factors which we, by our remand order, [require] the
Commission to undertake.' 1 29
The Second Circuit was consistent with -this opinion concerning the re-
view of an EIS when, in Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v.
Volpe,180 it enjoined another project pursuant to the filing of a proper im-
pact statement, reasoning that the preparation of a federal aid highway EIS
by the Department of Transportation had not adequately discussed alter-
natives to the project or the project's environmental effects. The statement
was not subjected to review by other federal agencies, and it was not re-
viewed by the Council on Environmental Quality. Therefore, it did not
satisfy NEPA. Although it is apparent that the project was enjoined in
Monroe County due to a failure to follow certain specified procedural steps,
substantive review of the EIS was also one of the elements given as a
basis for the injunction.
C. Fourth Circuit
In Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke'31 the Fourth
Circuit adopted the position that when a federal court reviews an agency de-
cision to enter into construction of a major project it must consider whether
the agency arbitrarily and capriciously violated substantive policies of
NEPA as well as whether it complied with the procedural requirements of
the Act in reaching its decision. The Fourth Circuit cited a decision by
the Eighth Circuit for the proposition that the courts have the authority to
inquire into substantive decisions:
The review is a limited one for the purpose of determining whether the
agency reached its decision after a full, good faith consideration of en-
vironmental factors made under the standards set forth in §§ 101 and
102 of NEPA; and whether the actual balance of costs and benefits
125 Id. at 648.
126 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).
127 Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d
608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
128 Id. at 614.
129 453 F.2d at 481.
130 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972).
131473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973).
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struck by the agency according to these standards was arbitrary or
clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental factors. 132
In the Fourth Circuit, then, substantive inquiry is limited to determining
"'whether there has been a clear error of judgment.' 1"3
D. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit has not allowed substantive review, taking the position
that the courts' only duty is to ascertain whether the procedural require-
ments under NEPA have been met.134  Only if a plaintiff raises substantial
environmental issues should a court proceed to examine and weigh the evi-
dence of both the plaintiff and the agency to determine whether the agency
reasonably concluded that the particular project would have no effects
significantly affecting the environmental quality.1"5  If the plaintiff can
establish that there was an inadequate evidentiary development before the
agency, the district court should supplement the deficient administrative rec-
ord by taking evidence on the environmental impact of the project. The
view of the Fifth Circuit on whether NEPA should be considered a "sub-
stantive" or "procedural" Act is thus firmly established: "The mandate
of the NEPA on federal agencies is that they comply with the procedural
duties imposed by the Act to the fullest extent possible."' 6
E. Seventh Circuit
"Other than the procedural requirements . . . no judicially enforceable
duties are created by . . . the National Environmental Policy Act . .. .,, 3
Thus, the Seventh Circuit has held that the declaration of a national en-
vironmental policy and a statement of purpose appearing in this Act is not
sufficient to establish substantive rights. It is apparent that an EIS review
by this circuit will pertain only to the procedural aspects of NEPA, in-
cluding the proper filing of an EIS, rather than the substance. This con-
cern of the Seventh Circuit for the specified procedures established in NEPA
for filing an EIS rather than its substantive content is focused in Scherr v.
Volpe."'8 In Scherr the court upheld an injunction against a federal-aid
highway project, because the state official's reports that considered the en-
vironmental effects of the proposed project were not made public, were not
prepared in consultation with federal officials, and were not indicative of
the evaluation process required by NEPA. The injunction was granted and
affirmed on procedural grounds.
132 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 353 (8th Cir.
1972).
133 473 F.2d at 665.
134 Pizitz v. Volpe, 467 F.2d 208 (5th Cir.), aft'g 4 ENviR. REP.-CAs. 1195 (M.D.
Ala. 1972).
135 Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973); see Save
Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973).
136 Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 476 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1973).
137 Bradford Township v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, 463 F.2d 537, 540
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047 (1972).
138 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972).
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Although the Seventh Circuit has not directly spoken on the point of
whether it will allow a substantive review of an EIS, its unquestionable in-
terpretation of NEPA in Scherr as a "procedural" act rather than one creat-
ing substantive rights lends support to an argument favoring a procedural
rather than substantive review.
F. Eighth Circuit
When an EIS is challenged and brought before the court for review, the
court will first determine if the agency reached its decision after a full,
good faith consideration of the nevironmental factors. Under the holding
of Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, the court
must then determine, according to the standards set forth in sections 101 (b)
and 102(1) of NEPA whether "'the actual balance of costs and benefits
that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environ-
mental values.' " 9 In that case the Eighth Circuit emphatically recognized
NEPA as a "substantive" Act, stating that "[t]he language of NEPA, as
well as its legislative history, make it clear that the Act is more than an en-
vironmental full-disclosure law. NEPA was intended to effect substantive
changes in decision-making.' 140 Speaking directly on the point of substan-
tive review, the Eighth Circuit concluded that "courts have an obligation to
review substantive agency decisions on the merits . . . .NEPA is silent
as to judicial review, and no special reasons appear for not reviewing the
decision of the agency. To the contrary, the prospect of substantive re-
view should improve the quality of agency decisions and should make it
more likely that the broad purposes of NEPA will be realized.' 14'
This policy of the Eighth Circuit was later elaborated in Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke,142 where the court determined that NEPA
authorizes federal district courts to consider whether an agency decision to
construct a project arbitrarily and capriciously violates the substantive pol-
icies of the Act. At the same time, however, the court cautioned that al-
though there is to be a careful search and study of the facts surrounding
each particular situation, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one.
The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. 143
G. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit in Jicarilla Apache Tribe of Indians v. Morton refused
to balance the benefits of a particular project against its adverse effects on
the environment, holding instead that the scope of review is very narrowly
139 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 300 (8th
Cir. 1972), quoting Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109,
1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
140 Id. at 297.
141 Id. at 298-99.
142 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972).




limited to whether the necessary procedural requirements have been met.' 44
The court found that considerations of what particular information is re-
quired to complete an EIS were beyond its jurisdiction and accordingly lim-
ited its review to questions of procedure. Only when the issue "is purely
a question of mechanical procedures, requiring no expertise in a particular
substantive area," is it proper for review under NEPA. 145
H. Tenth Circuit
In McQueary v. Laird140 the Tenth Circuit rejected the contention that
NEPA creates any sort of substantive right -to a clean environment. It
followed this position in Upper Pecos Association v. Starts, ruling that "[t]he
mandates of the N.E.P.A. pertain to procedure and not to substance, that is,
decision-making in a given agency is required to meet certain procedural
standards, yet the agency is left in control of the substantive aspects of the
decision. The N.E.P.A. creates no substantive rights in citizens to safe health-
ful, productive and culturally pleasing surroundings."'1 47 The Tenth Circuit
has thus aligned itself with the Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits in allowing
only procedural review in NEPA cases.
I. Summary
Generally speaking, the District of Columbia, Second, Fourth and
Eighth Circuits permit some substantive review of cases arising under NEPA,
while the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits allow only a very limited
substantive review if any. Although the circuits vary in their conclusions
and interpretations of the role they play in reviewing an agency determina-
tion concerning an EIS, it is the consensus of the circuits that NEPA is, at
the very least, an "environmental full disclosure law," for agency decision-
makers and the general public. 148 Therefore, although some circuit courts
may voice an opinion that there is no substantive review allowed under
NEPA, it is possible to argue before all courts that if inadequate considera-
tion is given to alternatives in an EIS or if inaccurate representations are
propounded in an EIS they amount not only to a substantive breach but
actually a procedural breach of section 102(2)(C) of NEPA. The basis
for this position is that section 102 of NEPA impliedly requires that an EIS
be complete and accurate; it does not contemplate the submission of mis-
leading reports. Therefore, when misleading reports are submitted, an
agency has not even met the procedural requirements of NEPA; and under
such circumstances, all courts should accept jurisdiction for a substantive
type of review.
144 471 F.2d 1275, 1280 (9th Cir. 1973).
145 Id. at 1281. The court cited with approval the District of Columbia Circuit's
Decision in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115
(D.C. Cir. 1971). For a discussion of this case, see note 117 supra, and accompanying
text.
146449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971).
147 452 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1971).




IV. PIECEMEAL PROJECTS AND MULTI-AGENCY ACTIONS
There has been substantial concern recently with respect to what type of
EIS should be prepared when projects are started in segments. This type
of problem is inextricably intertwined with the retroactive nature of NEPA
and the impact of multi-agency actions. This section will briefly consider
the necessity of preparing an EIS for projects completed after January 1,
1970, but started prior to that date. The problem of NEPA application to
projects constructed in segments but commenced after the effective date
of the Act will be examined in terms of the relation that each segment bears
to the entire project. Lastly, the problems of multi-agency actions and the
"lead-agency" concept will be described.
A. Retroactive Application of NEPA
The express words adopted in the Act itself shed relatively little light on
the issue of retroactive application. Section 101 provides that "all practi-
cable means and measures" are to 'be taken to protect the environment,
while the phrase "to the fullest extent possible" modifies the requirements
of section 102. Although these phrases have been interpreted to indicate
both retroactivity 49 and nonretroactivity, 150 neither conclusion is compelled
by the provisions of the Act. The statute is not made expressly retroactive,
but it omits 'the traditional "grandfather" clause often inserted to assure
that retroactive application is not read into a law. Equally unenlighten-
ing is the legislative history that contains little more than expressions of hope
that agencies will not attempt to evade its mandates by a narrow construc-
tion.' 5 '
The CEQ Guidelines approach the retroactivity issue in a more direct
manner. According to these Guidelines, the Act is to be applied to "further
major Federal acts," even though they arise from projects initiated prior to
its effective date.' 52  The Guidelines accept the fact that reassessment of
the basic course of action will not always be possible, but cautioned that in
such cases further incremental major actions should be planned in such a
way to minimize environmental damage 'and take into account factors not
fully evaluated at the outset of the project. Accordingly, it is apparent
that the language adopted by the CEQ in formulating its guidelines re-
flects its opinion that NEPA is not fully retroactive.
Since the question of retroactive application is not definitely answered by
the statute itself, the legislative history, or the implementing regulations, it
has been the subject of several judicial decisions. Pennsylvania En-
vironmental Council v. Bartlett'63 is the leading case in support of nonretro-
activity. In that case the court examined NEPA and determined that
149 Id. at 755.
50 Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 454 F.2d 613, 624 (3d Cir.
1971).
'5' H.R. Rm,. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1969).
152 CEQ Guidelines § 1500.13, 38 Fed. Reg. 20,556 (1973).
153 454 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1971).
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"[t]here is no evidence of a congressional intention that the Act be ap-
plied retroactively to reopen decisions [that] had become final before
[the effective] date."'154 The court stated that under the particular cir-
cumstances of the case the final federal approval took place prior to the ef-
fective date of NEPA, and therefore, the Act was not applicable. Other
cases have reached the same conclusion. 155 According to some, the con-
gressional failure to make the Act explicitly retroactive was determinative,
particularly in light of the realization that Congress must have been aware of
the numerous incomplete projects in progress when NEPA was adopted. 15
One court made retroactive application contingent upon substantial devia-
tion from any plans implemented before NEPA was passed. 15 7 Others
have urged a comparison of the likelihood of a change in plans with the cost
of a delay in construction. 158  A recent case directly on point is Greene
County Planning Board v. FPC, in which the court, after studying and con-
sidering the major trends of judicial interpretations concerning the retroac-
tive application of NEPA, concluded that "we see no basis for applying
NEPA retroactively to the licensing of the basic project which became final
nearly six months prior to the effective date of the Act."' 59
In contrast to these cases, an impressive number of courts have either
expressly stated that NEPA is fully retroactive or have applied the Act to
projects begun before its effective date by using other theories. One of the
most innovative cases interpreting NEPA is Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Corps of Engineers,160 in which the project at issue was a dam that
Congress had authorized to be constructed in 1958. The construction be-
gan in 1965 and by the effective date of NEPA, January 1, 1970, nine mil-
lion dollars of the projected fourteen million dollar cost of the project had
already been expended. The court, in deciding that an impact statement
must be filed pursuant to NEPA before construction could continue, said
that it was "not suggesting that the status of the work should not be con-
sidered in determining whether to proceed with the project. . . . [But] the
degree of the completion of the work should not inhibit the objective and
thorough evaluation of the environmental impact of the project as required
by NEPA."'' 1 The Act was interpreted to compel federal agencies "to ob-
jectively evaluate all of their projects, regardless of how much money has
already been spent thereon and regardless of the completion of the work."' 62
154 Id. at 624.
155 See, e.g., Concerned Citizens of Marlboro v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 332, 335 (3d Cir.
1972).
156 See, e.g., Elliot v. Volpe, 328 F. Supp. 831, 835 (D. Mass. 1971).
157 San Francisco Tomorrow v. Romney, 342 F. Supp. 77, 82 (N.D. Cal. 1972).158 See Civic Improvement Comm. v. Volpe, 4 ENVIR. REP.-CAS. 1160 (W.D.N.C.),
ajfd, 459 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1972); Investment Syndicates, Inc. v. Richmond, 318 F.
Supp. 1038 (D. Ore. 1970).
159 455 F.2d 412, 424 (2d Cir. 1972).
160 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark.), injunction granted, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark.
1971).
161 325 F. Supp. at 746.
162 Id.; cf. Natural Resources Defences Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356




The court stated that the duty to make an environmental assessment was
a continuing responsibility to study and improve plans and to determine
whether to go forward with, abandon, or restudy the whole project.
Several courts have applied a "balancing of factors" test to projects be-
gun before NEPA became effective in dealing with the issue of retroactiv-
ity. The Fourth Circuit in Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe,
holding that an impact statement was required for a highway project
planned prior to the Act's effective date, noted that "Section 102(c) is appli-
cable to a project until it has reached the state of completion where the
costs of abandoning or altering the proposed route would clearly outweigh
the benefits therefrom." 168  Since the construction contracts in Arlington
Coalition had not yet been let, the court determined that application of
NEPA was warranted even without the necessity of considering its retro-
activity under the circumstances. Although this case did expressly approve
the nonretroactivity theory of Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bart-
lett,'6 4 it ultimately applied NEPA to a project initiated before the Act.
Opposed to this, however, is Environmental Law Fund v. Volpe,165 which
refused to follow Bartlett and at the same time declined application of NEPA
to a project similar to that considered in Arlington Coalition. The court
ruled that NEPA requires an impact statement to be filed for the continua-
tion of a project ongoing before and after January 1, 1970, only if practi-
cable, the four factors of practicability being community participation in
planning, state efforts to protect the environment, likely environmental harm,
and cost of delay. Balancing these factors, the court concluded that com-
pliance with the Act would be impracticable under the circumstances, and
therefore declined to enjoin the project. Likewise, the court in Jicarilla
Apache Tribe of Indians v. Morton'66 upheld a lower court's refusal to
enjoin construction of a power plant, noting that an impact statement will
be required for an ongoing project only when it is practicable to reassess
the basic course of action.
A recent decision in Scherr v. Volpe' 67 recognized that while NEPA is
not to be given retroactive effect as a result of applying the balancing of
factors test, NEPA does apply prospectively to certain projects ongoing
when the Act became effective. Considering the congressional command
that the Act be complied with "to the fullest extent possible," the court
ruled that an ongoing project is subject to the requirements of section 102
until it has reached that stage of completion where the cost of abandoning
or altering the proposed project clearly outweighs the benefits that could
flow from compliance with section 102.
Another theory that has been proposed and accepted by some courts,
with modification, in disposing of the retroactivity issue is the "incremental
action theory." This theory originated in the Guidelines adopted by the
168 458 F.2d 1323, 1332 (4th Cir. 1972).
164 454 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1971); see note 150 supra, and accompanying text.
165 340 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
166 471 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1973).
167 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972).
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CEQ which provide that IEPA is to apply to "further major Federal
acts," even if the basic project was initiated before the Act became effec-
tive.168 According to the Guidelines, even when it is not possible to reassess
the basic course of action, "it is still important that further incremental
major actions be shaped so as to enhance and restore environmental qual-
ity as well as to avoid or minimize adverse environmental consequences. '' 169
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers the district
court cited the Guidelines with approval, noting that the actual extension of
the dam was an incremental action.170 Yet, it is evident that the court did
not absolutely accept the incremental theory, because it required the con-
sideration of an alternative of no dam at all, while under the incremental
theory only alternative ways to complete the project must be considered,
and not the prospect of abandoning the project completely.
It is clear that this issue of retroactive application of NEPA is far from
settled and likely to persist, since most major federal projects are in the
planning stage for a number of years and are not likely to attract public
attention and potential injunctive actions until a fairly advanced stage of
development is reached.
B. Piecemeal Projects
Since the express words of NEPA and the regulations for implementing
the Act do little to clarify its application to projects constructed in seg-
ments, it is necessary to rely directly upon interpretations of NEPA re-
quirements adopted by various courts. In Named Individual Members
of San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Dept.171 a highway
project was divided into three segments. The two end segments culminated
at the boundaries of a public park. The defendant in this case argued that
no EIS should be required for these two segments because they did not take
any parkland. The court was stern in its decision:
The frustrating effect such piecemeal administrative approvals would
have . . . is plain for any man to see. Patently, the construction of
these two 'end segments' to the very border, if not into, the Parklands,
will make destruction of further parkland inevitable, or, at least, will
severely limit the number of 'feasible and prudent' alternatives to
avoiding the Park. The Secretary's approach to his . . .responsibi-
ties thus makes a joke of the 'feasible and prudent alternatives' stand-
ard, and we not only decline to give such an approach our imprimatur,
we specifically declare it unlawful.172
Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe' 78 emphasized the coercive and frus-
trating effect of avoiding preparation of an EIS by splitting a project into
168 CEQ Guidelines § 1500.13, 38 Fed. Reg. 20,556 (1973).
169 Id.
170 325 F. Supp. 728, 743 (E.D. Ark.), injunction granted, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D.
Ark. 1971). The CEQ Guidelines cited were those issued in 1970 and published at
35 Fed. Reg. 7392. The relevant section remained substantially the same in the 1973
draft.
17' 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971).
172 Id. at 1023.
178 346 F. Supp, 731 (DD.C. 1972).
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segments. The court concluded that if an impact statement is prepared
with respect to only a small segment of a proposed highway project, NEPA's
requirements of adequate consideration of alternatives cannot be complied
with properly. With respect to a proposed highway, consideration of al-
ternatives has two dimensions: an initial choice between building the high-
way or relying on existing routes or alternative means of transportation,
and a subsequent choice among various alternative routes and designs.
When consideration of the environmental impact is only concentrated on a
small segment of a proposed route, adequate consideration of either of
these choices becomes impossible, because alternatives to not building an
expressway cannot be brought into focus when consideration is given to
just one segment. Additionally, placement of one segment tends to narrow
the range of choices for placement of the remainder of the entire highway,
thereby precluding adequate consideration of alternative routes. In other
words, since NEPA requires impact statements to reflect agency consideration
of all possible alternatives to a federal project, including whether to actually
construct or enter into the project at all, the requirement will not be satisfied
by the issuance of separate impact statements for each individual segment
of the whole project.
Under Sierra Club v. Froehlke,-74 if the purposes and effects of a project
are predominantly local in nature, then it may be considered a separate seg-
ment of a larger project and evaluated accordingly for NEPA purposes;
but if the project is essentially part of the larger undertaking, then it must
be considered along with the whole project. The court in that case en-
joined construction of a dam pending completion and review of an EIS filed
for the entire proposed river project. The concerns of the court were es-
sentially those of the Fifth Circuit in Named Individual Members.
Not all segmented projects are rightly considered in their entirety, how-
ever. In Citizens v. Brinegar17" the court pointed out that always to require
approval of an entire freeway system before any action can begin is simply
not necessitated by NEPA. This strict requirement ought to be demanded
only in situations when an essentially unified project is divided into sections
in order to attain approval to proceed with the project without submitting
an EIS. In fact, the court required that there be an assertion that the
agency involved acted in a clandestine manner to avoid direct statutory
mandates.
Another consideration is the status of construction. In Ecos v. Volpel 7o
the court recognized that economic costs and benefits ought to be weighed
in determining whether to consider a project as a whole or in segments.
If construction has begun, state and federal highway officials' failures to pre-
pare a final EIS concerning a particular segment will not warrant an in-
junction halting construction when the costs of abandoning or altering the
174 5 ENVm. REP.-CAS. 1033 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
175 5 ENviR. REP.-CAS. 1231 (D. Ariz. 1973). See also Thompson v. Fugate,347 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Va. 1972); Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp.
1167 (S.D. Iowa 1972).
176 5 ENVIR. REP.-CAS. 1019 (M.D.N.C. 1973).
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segment clearly outweigh any benefit that would be gained by halting work
pending compliance with NEPA. But if construction has not begun and few
rights of way have been acquired, an injunction may be granted halting
work pending the preparation of an EIS.
Whatever factors are found determinative, it is clear that the courts will
act to prevent the frustration of the purpose and intent of NEPA caused by
piecemeal treatment of major projects. NEPA is designed to assure not
merely that a major federal action will be taken with minimum damage to
the environment. 177 It also requires an agency decision, informed as to all
pertinent environmental factors, as to whether or not an action should be
taken at all, and this cannot be accomplished without ample consideration
of the project in its entirety. When presented with attempts to avoid a true
assessment of the environmental impact of a project, the courts have been
consistent in penetrating through a facade erected to camouflage the actual
environmental consequences.
C. Multi-Agency Actions and the Lead Agency Concept
A problem related to the retroactive application of NEPA and the seg-
menting of projects is whether a single agency can prepare an EIS on be-
half of other agencies also involved in the same project. This problem was
first attacked by use of the concept of a lead agency. Neither required nor
even mentioned in NEPA, the concept was developed in the 1971 pro-
posed CEQ Guidelines: "The lead agency should prepare an environ-
mental statement if it is reasonable to anticipate a cumulatively significant
impact on the environment from Federal action. 'Lead agency' refers to
the Federal agency which has primary authority for committing the Federal
Government to a course of action with significant environmental impact."'17
Since the CEQ is merely an advisory body without authority to promulgate
regulations,179 it apparently relied heavily on two cases to support its rec-
ommendations in the proposed Guidelines. In Upper Pecos Association v.
Stans' 0 the court held that the National Forest Service was the lead agency
on a road development project in the mountains of northern New Mexico.
Since the Service filed an EIS, it was not necessary for other involved
agencies, including the Economic Development Administration, to file addi-
tional impact statements, even though the Administration was responsible
for granting the funds for the project. In a similar vein, the court in Nat-
ural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton"" pointed out that the pol-
icy of NEPA required that a large project, such as the leasing of tracts for
oil and gas development on the outer continental shelf, be evaluated with re-
177 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
178 CEQ Guidelines, 36 Fed. Reg. 7724-25 (1971).
179 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 204, 42 U.S.C. 4344 (1973);
see Greene County Planning Board v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 421 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 849 (1972).
180 328 F. Supp. 332 (D.N.M.), aff'd, 452 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1971), judgment
vacated and case remanded for determination as to mootness, 409 U.S. 1021 (1972).
181 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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gard to its impact on the environment as a unified project rather than as
piecemeal agency actions. The court suggested that the agency with broader
responsibility for the project undertake the burden of preparing, in consulta-
tion with the other agencies involved, the required EIS.
Both Upper Pecos and Natural Resources Defense Council were decided
before Greene County Planning Board v. FPC. 8 2  In the latter case the
court refused to allow the Federal Power Commission to circulate as the
single EIS for a project involving the construction of a high-voltage trans-
mission line a statement prepared by the Power Authority of the State of
New York. The court held that the Commission could comply with its duties
under NEPA only by conducting its own evaluation of the project. Greene
County followed the view of agency responsibility for NEPA compliance
earlier enunciated in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC.183
Without proscribing action in concert between involved agencies, Calvert
Cliffs' imposed on each agency the individual responsibility for evaluating
a proposed project from its own perspective.
The allocation of responsibility in Greene County and Calvert Cliffs' seems
more in accord with the policy of NEPA, as opposed to the lead agency con-
cept defined in the proposed CEQ Guidelines and adhered to in Upper
Pecos and Natural Resources Defense Council. In light of these new in-
terpretations of federal agency responsibility, the CEQ has revised its
Guidelines.'8 4  The 1973 Guidelines allow the possibility of joint prepara-
tion of an EIS or designation of a lead agency to act as supervisor in addi-
tion to its individual responsibility in the evaluation process. But under the
1973 Guidelines the burden of supervision no longer carries with it pri-
mary responsibility for preparation of the substance of the EIS. Whether
the EIS is a joint effort or whether it is supervised by one agency, "the
statement should contain an environmental assessment of the full range of
Federal actions involved, [and] should reflect the views of all participating
agencies. ... 185
Because of the unfavorable judicial attitude toward the lead agency con-
cept, and because of the additional burden imposed on an agency which
undertakes to supervise EIS preparation, the more viable alternative is in-
creasingly the joint statement approach suggested in the new CEQ Guide-
lines. This approach further obviates the problems in selecting the super-
visory or lead agency.
V. THE IMPACT OF NEPA ON STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
NEPA has influenced the states to develop their own laws for the pro-
tection of the environment. Federal litigation has had its effect on the final
products. The state laws are generally aimed at completing the federal-
state regulation of environmental matters and at avoiding confrontations in
federal grant programs where a federal-state alliance is created.
182 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).
183449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
184 CEQ Guidelines, 38 Fed. Reg. 20,550 (1973).
185 Id. § 1500.7(b), 38 Fed. Reg. 20,553 (1973).
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Three major problems seem to have plagued the states in their develop-
ment of environmental policy acts. First, there seems to be a lack of en-
forcement and implementation procedures. Second, there is usually inade-
quate funding, which, when combined with the near-prohibitive costs of en-
forcement, render the acts largely ineffective. Finally, there is a lack of
trained legal experts devoted to the administration of the laws. On an
individual basis, the states find it hard to justify regulation of their own
agencies to the extent possible at the federal level.
State laws vary from those prescribing environmental impact review for
major actions to those requiring review in only certain limited situations.
In Part A the laws of the various states are outlined, together with references
where further information is available. In Part B a model state statute is
proposed.
A. Requirements and Proposals for
Environmental Impact Statements in the States





None. However, Department of Environ-
mental Conservation reviews projects
which have potential for environmental
impact and submits comments to appro-
priate agencies.
Arizona
No general requirement. Game and Fish
Commission on July 2, 1971, adopted a
policy requiring Fish and Game Depart-
ment to prepare EIS on proposed water-
oriented development projects. Conser-
vationists are proposing a state policy
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California Environmental Quality Act of
1970, CAL. PUB, RES. CODE §§ 21000-
174 (West Supp. 1973).
Colorado
No current requirement. Senate Bill 43
(1973), the proposed "Colorado En-
vironmental Policy Act," would require
EIS for major public and private actions
under the jurisdiction of any unit of state
or local government.
John S. Tooker, Director









Executive Order No. 16, Oct. 4, 1972.
Delaware
No general requirement, and none pro-
posed. Under the Delaware Coastal Zone
Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 7001-13
(Supp. 1972), applicants for coastal zone










Delaware State Planning Office
530 S. duPont Highway
Dover, DE 19901
District of Columbia
No current requirement. A proposal to
require EIS for major construction pro-jects is under consideration.
Florida
No requirement. A bill similar to NEPA
was introduced in the 1972 session of the
legislature, but failed to pass.





415 12th St., N.W.
Washington, DC 20004
James K. Lewis, Director of Staff
Committee on Environmental
Pollution Control






No general requirement. EIS are re-
quired for projects proposed to be under-
taken by the Georgia Tollways Author-
ity. The Office of Planning and Research
of the Department of Natural Resources
currently is investigating the possibility
of formulating legislation to require EIS
for certain state and local actions.
James T. McIntyre, Jr.,
Director, Office of Planning
and Budget
270 Washington St. S.W.
Atlanta, GA 30334
Hawaii
Executive Order dated Aug. 23, 1971.
The Governor's office is drafting legisla-
tion to extend the EIS requirement to




No requirement. Governor Richard
Ogilvie proposed legislation similar
NEPA in 1972, but it failed to pass.
Indiana
IND. CODE §§ 13-1-10-1 to -8 (1973).
Iowa
No requirement. There is considerable
discussion among state officials and it
appears possible that a bill will be intro-
duced in the 1973 session of the legis-
lature.




Office of the Governor
550 Halekauwila St., Room 301
Honolulu, HI 96813
Glenn W. Nichols, Director







309 W. Washington St.
Chicago, IL 60606








Office for Planning and
Programming
523 E. 12th St.








No requirement. Legislation to establish
a general EIS requirement was introduced
in the 1972 session of the legislature
(House Bill 1150), but failed to pass.
Maine
No requirement. There is some interest
among conservation groups in introducing
a bill in the 1973 session of the legisla-
ture.
Maryland
No requirement. A bill was introduced
in the last session of the general assembly,
but failed to pass.
Massachusetts
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, §§ 61-62
(1973).
Michigan
"Environmental Impact Review Require-
ment," Executive Directive 1971-10
(Sept. 30, 1971). The Governor's office
is considering recommending legislation
to give the current EIS procedure a
statutory base.








Department of Natural Resources
Frankfort, KY 40601
Eddie L. Schwertz, Jr.
Assistant Director
Office of State Planning
P.O. Box 44425







Secretary of State Planning
301 W. Preston St.
Baltimore, MD 21201














No requirement. Governor Wendell R.
Anderson has proposed a bill for a state
environmental policy act that would au-
thorize a proposed Environmental Quality
Council to require EIS from any state
agency or private developer on any pro-
ject or program that is determined to
have a significant environmental effect.
Mississippi
None. A proposal to create a coastal
zone management program, including
EIS requirements, died in the 1973 ses-
sion of the legislature.
Missouri
No requirement. Two bills similar to
NEPA were introduced in the 1972 ses-
sion of the general assembly; both died in
committee. The state administration has
created an Environmental Impact State-
ment Task Force to evaluate other state
policy acts and make recommendations.
Joseph E. Sizer, Director
Environmental Planning
State Planning Agency
802 Capitol Square Building
St. Paul, MN 55101
Edward A. May, Jr., Assistant
to the Coordinator
Federal-State Programs
Office of the Governor








Jefferson City, MO 65101
Montana
Montana Environmental Policy
1971, MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
69-6501 to -6517 (Supp. 1973).





No general requirement, and none pro-
posed. Department of Roads prepares




Office of Planning and
Programming
Box 94601, State Capitol
Lincoln, NB 68509
Nevada
No general requirement. EIS require-
ment for utility plant siting was estab-
lished by NEV. REV. STAT. § 704.870
(1971).








No requirement. Requiring EIS for
major land developments, whether private
or public, is one of the priorities of a
legislative coalition formed by the state's
major conservation organizations (for in-
formation on this proposal contact:
SPACE, Box 757, Concord, NH 03301).
Raymond P. Gerbi, Jr.
Assistant to the Director of
Comprehensive Planning
Office of the Governor
Concord, NH 03301
New Jersey
No general requirement. Legislation is
being prepared in both houses of the
legislature. A special EIS requirement
applies to a 35-mile extension of the New
Jersey Turnpike. The Department of
Environmental Protection has prepared
guidelines for an environmental assess-
ment procedure and distributed copies to
local agencies for their guidance. In
addition, the department is suggesting
that such assessments be prepared for
major industrial construction prior to
issuance of necessary air or water pollu-
tion permits. Several local jurisdictions
require EIS as part of the zoning and sub-
division process.
Alfred T. Guido






Environmental Quality Control Act,
1971, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-20-1 to
-8 (Supp. 1973). A revision, entitled




Sante Fe. NM 87501
New York
No general requirement. An adminis-
trative regulation (Item 73, Budget Re-
quest Manual) requires environmental
review and clearance for state-funded
capital construction projects. A bill for
a state environmental policy act, which
included an EIS requirement, passed both
houses of the legislature in 1972 (As-
sembly Bill 9245-A), but was vetoed by
Governor Rockefeller, who said that it
would duplicate existing requirements,
confuse responsibility among state
agencies, and increase expenditures at a










North Carolina Environmental Policy
Act. 1971, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-1
to-43 (Supp. 1973).
North Dakota
No general requirements and none pend-
ing. A Special EIS procedure applies to
certain waste water treatment facilities.
Ohio
No requirement at present. Governor
John J. Gilligan has requested his execu-
tive department to institute an EIS pro-
gram, and the Ohio EPA is attempting to




No requirement. Legislation supported
by Governor Tom McCall is being
drafted for introduction in the 1973 ses-
sion of the Legislative Assembly. A
similar proposal died in the 1971 session.
Pennsylvania
None
Arthur W. Cooper, Assistant
Secretary for Resource
Management




Norman L. Peterson, Director










450 E. Town St.
Columbus, OH 43216
Don N. Strain, Director
State Grant-in-Aid Clearinghouse
Office of Community Affairs
and Planning
4901 Lincoln Blvd.
Oklahoma City, OK 73105














Public Environmental Policy Act, P.R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1121-40 (Supp.
1973).
Rhode Island
No requirement. A bill to establish a
general EIS requirement was introduced
in the 1972 session of the Rhode Island
Legislature (H 5179), but was not re-
ported from committee.
South Carolina
No requirement. A bill to require EIS
review for major private and public pro-
jects was introduced in the 1973 session




No requirement. Governor Winfield
Dunn's administration is considering pro-
posing an act similar to NEPA; no deci-
sion has been taken.
Texas
"Policy for the Environment" adopted
by Interagency Council on Natural Re-
sources and Environment, March 1972.
Utah
No requirement. A bill to require EIS





1550 Ponce de Leon Ave.
4th Floor
Santurce, PR 00910










Donald G. Kurvink, Associate
Director
Office of Comprehensive Health
Planning
Department of Health
Office Building No. 2
Pierre, SD 57501
Edward L. Thackston, Staff
Assistant for Environmental
Affairs








Office of the State Planning
Coordinator
118 State Capitol




No requirement similar to that under
NEPA. However, under Act 250 of
1970, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 §§ 6045-
46 (1970), any project involving change
in land use of any significance undergoes
scrutiny as to environmental impact.
Virginia
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-17.31 to -17.65
(Supp. 1973).
Washington
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 43.21A.010-












Robert H. Kirby, Director
Division of State Planning and
Community Affairs
1010 James Madison Building
Richmond, VA 23219
Dennis L. Lundblad




Ira S. Latimer, Director
Department of Natural Resources
Charleston, WV 25305
L.P. Voigt, Secretary
Department of Natural Resources
Box 450
Madison, WI 53701
Vincent J. Horn, Jr.




B. Suggested State Environmental Policy Act
Damage to the environment has often been an unexpected and unin-
tended consequence of governmental programs. Responding to this prob-
lem, the federal government and eleven states have enacted environmental
policy acts which call for the preparation of environmental impact statements
on actions of public agencies which may have a significant effect on the en-
vironment. These environmental impact statements set forth the environ-
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mental impact of a proposed project and examine alternatives and mitiga-
tion measures that could reduce the adverse effects.
This Suggested State Environmental Policy Act was drafted by a work-
shop at the Second National Symposium on State Environmental Legisla-
tion on April 10-12, 1973, in Washington, D.C. It draws heavily on ex-
perience gained in administering the National Environmental Policy Act
and the California Environmental Quality Act of 1970.
The suggested act follows, the approach of the National Environmental
Policy Act in being fairly simple, leaving the details to be filled in by ad-
ministrative guidelines. The workshop delegates believed that individual
states would need flexibility in adjusting the many minor details to their in-
dividual situations.
In considering a proposed law dealing with environmental impact state-
ments, a state should consider the following important issues. The Sug-
gested State Environmental Policy Act represents the workshop's pro-
posed solution to these issues. Where there were differences of opinion on
significant issues, alternative solutions to the problems are shown in brack-
ets.
(1). To which levels of government should the act apply? A state
should consider whether it wants to apply the requirement for environmental
impact statements only to state level agencies or whether it wishes to apply
the requirement to local agencies also. The resolution of this issue is not
clear in most of the state statutes adopted to the date of this writing. The
California Act applies explicitly to both state and local agencies.
(2). Should the act apply only to public works construction or should
it also apply to regulatory activities and approval of private actions? NEPA
has always applied to direct government operations and to regulatory and
licensing activities. The California Act was amended in 1972 to make clear
that it applied to regulatory activities and the granting of discretionary ap-
provals to private activities.
(3). Should the act apply only to major actions or should it apply to
all actions which may have a significant effect on the environment? NEPA
applies only to major actions. This follows the belief that large activities
will be the main ones that have significant effects on the environment and
that government will become bogged down if it has to prepare and review
too many reports. Limiting the requirement to major actions is a simple
way to screen out actions which do not require the preparation of an im-
pact statement. On the other hand, there may be many small projects which
may have a large effect on the environment. California provides no size
limitation and requires reports on all actions which may have a significant ef-
fect on the environment.
(4). Are there activities which should be specifically excluded from the
operation of the act? A state may wish to exempt emergency actions be-
cause there may not be sufficient time for a governmental agency'to eval-
uate environmental factors before taking action. The suggested act fol-
lows the California precedent in exempting ministerial actions. With respect
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to these activities it was believed that governmental powers are too narrowly
confined to enable the agency to shape the activity to improve the effect on
the environment.
The Guidelines implementing NEPA and the California Act both ex-
clude environmentally regulatory actions such as setting standards for air and
water pollution control. This exclusion under NEPA is currently the sub-
ject of litigation. The requirement for an impact statement was not thought to
be necessary for these regulatory actions because the programs were con-
ducted for the express purpose of protecting the environment and because
the programs have considered the environmental effects of their activities
since their beginnings. Whatever benefits might be gained from the formal
preparation of impact statements could be lost as a result of the delays in en-
forcement. On the other hand, opponents of these exclusions have claimed
that these regulatory actions may have adverse effects on the environment
that were not considered by the regulatory agency or were not known to
the public at the time the actions were taken. The suggested act provides
for this exclusion.
(5). Should the environment be defined to include the totality of man's
surroundings or should it be limited to physical factors? In order to keep
the requirement for impact statements manageable, the suggested act limits
the definition of the environment to physical factors. Once a physical ef-
fect of an action is identified, social and economic factors can be considered
to determine whether that effect is significant and whether an impact state-
ment should be prepared. Environment was not limited to natural factors
because most of the country's population lives in urban areas, and man-
made surroundings form a large part of the environment which affect these
people.
(6). Should environmental effects be weighed against social and econ-
omic considerations? The suggested act provides that environmental pro-
tection should be given appropriate weight with social and economic consid-
erations in overall public policy. This follows the belief that public policy
calls for the balancing of many potentially competing factors and that en-
vironmental protection does not require shutting down the economy.
(7). Should the act specifically require public hearings on environ-
mental impact statements? Resolution of this decision was deliberately left
to guidelines to allow specific procedures to be established in conformity
with individual state practices.
(8). Should the act provide for the charging of fees to applicants or
should the cost of protecting the environment be borne by the public as a
whole? The suggested act allows for the charging of fees to the sponsors
of projects which require governmental approval. Participants in the work-
shop believed that a project which will affect the environment should bear
the costs of analyzing its effects on the environment.
(9). Should the act provide a statute of limitations for legal actions
brought under the act? Although the workshop believed that a statute of
limitations is necessary to provide certainty after a reasonable period, no
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statute of limitations was included in the act. Due to the variation in stat-
utes of limitations among the states, the resolution of this issue is deliberately
left to each individual state. This subject was believed to be too compli-
cated and calls for too much variation to allow a proposed solution in this
suggested act.
SUGGESTED STATE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
AN ACT to establish a State Environmental policy.
Section 1. Short Title
This Act may be cited as the "[Name of State] Environmental Policy
Act."
Section 2. Purpose
The purposes of this Act are: to declare a State policy which will en-
courage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environ-
ment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the en-
vironment and stimulate the health and welfare of man; and to enrich the
understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to
the people of the State.
Section 3. Findings and Declaration of State Environmental Policy
The Legislature finds and declares as follows:
(a) The maintenance of a quality environment for the people of this
State that at all times is healthful and pleasing to the senses and intellect of
man now and in the future is a matter of statewide concern.
(b) Every citizen has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation
and enhancement of the quality of the environment.
(c) There is a need to understand the relationship between the mainte-
nance of high-quality ecological systems and the general welfare of the
people of the State, including their enjoyment of the natural resources of
the State.
(d) The capacity of the environment is limited, and it is the intent of
the Legislature that the government of the State take immediate steps to
identify any critical thresholds for the health and safety of the people of the
State and take all coordinated actions necessary to prevent such thresholds
from being reached.
(e) It is the intent of the Legislature that to the fullest extent possible,
the policies, statutes, regulations, and ordinances of the State [and its politi-
cal subdivisions] should be interpreted and administered in accordance
with the policies set forth in this Act.
(f) It is the intent of the Legislature that the protection and enhance-
ment of the environment shall be given appropriate weight with social and
with economic considerations in public policy. Social, economic, and en-
vironmental factors shall be considered together in reaching decisions on
proposed public activities.
(g) It is the intent of the Legislature that all agencies conduct their af-
fairs with an awareness that they are stewards of the air, water, land, and
living resources, and that they have an obligation to protect the environ-
ment for the use and enjoyment of this and all future generations.
(h) It is the intent of the Legislature that all agencies which regulate
[Vol. 27
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS
activities of private individuals, corporations, and public agencies which are
found to affect the quality of the environment shall regulate such activities
so that major consideration is given to preventing environmental damage.
Section 4. Definitions
Unless the context otherwise requires, the definitions in this section shall
govern the construction of the following terms as used in this Act:
(a) "Agency" means the Executive and Administrative Departments,
Office, Boards, Commissions, and other units of the State Government, and
any such bodies created by the State.
[(a) "Agency" means any state agency, board or commission and any
local agency, including any city, county, and other political subdivision
of the State.]
(b) "Actions" include:
(1) Proposals for legislation.
(2) New and continuing projects or activities directly undertaken
by any public agency; or supported in whole or part through
contracts, grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms of funding
assistance from one or more public agencies; or involving the
issuance to a person of a lease, permit, license, certificate or
other entitlement for use by one or more public agencies;
(3) Policy, regulations, and procedure-making.(c) "Actions" do not include:
(1) Enforcement proceedings or the exercise of prosecutorial dis-
cretion in determining whether or not to institute such pro-
ceedings;
(2) Actions of a ministerial nature, involving no exercise of dis-
cretion.
(3) Emergency actions responding to an immediate threat to public
health or safety.
[(4) Actions of an environmentally protective regulatory nature.]
(d) "Environment" means the physical conditions which will be affected
by a proposed action, including land, air, water, minerals, flora, fauna,
noise, objects of historic or aesthetic significance, [existing patterns of pop-
ulation concentration, distribution, or growth, and existing community or
neighborhood character.]
(e) "Environmental impact statement" means a detailed statement set-
ting forth the matters specified in section 5(b) of this Act. It includes any
comments on a draft environmental statement which are received pursuant
to section 5(c) of this Act, and the agency's response to such comments,
to the extent that they raise issues not adequately resolved in the draft en-
vironmental statement.
(f) "Draft environmental impact statement" means a preliminary state-
ment prepared pursuant to section 5(c) of this Act.
Section 5. Environmental Responsibility of Agencies
(a) Agencies shall use all practicable means to realize the policies and
goals set forth in this Act, and to the maximum extent possible shall take
actions and choose alternatives which, consistent with other essential con-
siderations of state policy, minimize or avoid adverse environmental ef-
fects.
(b) All agencies shall prepare, or cause to be prepared by contract, an
environmental impact statement on any [major] action they propose or ap-
prove which may have a significant effect on the environment. Such a state-
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ment shall include a detailed statement setting forth the following:
(1) a description of the proposed action and its environmental
setting;
(2) the environmental impact of the proposed action including
short-term and long-term effects;
(3) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented;
(4) alternatives to the proposed action;
(5) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be
implemented;
(6) mitigation measures proposed to minimize the environmental
impact; and
(7) the growth-inducing aspects of the proposed action.
Such a statement shall also include copies or a summary of the substan-
tive comments received by the agency pursuant to subsection (c) of this
section, and the agency response to such comments. The purpose of an
environmental impact statement is to provide detailed information about the
effect which a proposed action is likely to have on the environment, to list
ways in which any adverse effects of such an action might be minimized
and to suggest alternatives to such an action.
(c) As early as possible in the formulation of a proposal for action
that is likely to require the preparation of an environmental impact state-
ment and in all cases prior to preparation of an environmental impact state-
ment, the responsible agency shall prepare or cause to be prepared a draft en-
vironmental statement describing in detail the proposed action and reasonable
alternatives to the action, and briefly discussing, on the basis of information
then available to the agency, the remaining items set forth in the preced-
ing subsection. The purpose of a draft environmental statement is to in-
form the public and other public agencies as early as possible about pro-
posed actions that may significantly affect the quality of the environment,
and to solicit comments which will assist the agency in determining the en-
vironmental consequences of the proposed action. The draft statement
should resemble in form and content the environmental impact statement
to be prepared after comments have been received and considered pursuant
to section 5(b) of this Act; however, the length and detail of the draft en-
vironmental statement will necessarily reflect the preliminary nature of the
proposal and the early stage at which it is prepared.
The draft statement shall be circulated for comment among other public
agencies which have jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to
any environmental impact involved and shall be made available for com-
ment by relevant federal agencies and interested members of the public.
(d) The environmental impact statement, prepared pursuant to subsection
(b) of this section, together with the comments of public and Federal agen-
cies and members of the public, shall be filed with the [Office of the Gov-
ernor] and made available to the public at least 30 days prior to taking
agency action on the proposal which is the subject of the environmental
impact statement.
(e) An agency may charge a fee to an applicant in order to recover
the costs incurred in preparing or causing to be prepared an environ-
mental impact statement on the action which the applicant requests from the
agency.
(f) When an agency decides to carry out or approve an action which
has been the subject of an environmental impact statement, it shall make
an explicit finding that the requirements of subsection (a) of this section
have been met and that all feasible action will be taken to minimize or
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avoid environmental problems that are revealed in the environmental im-
pact statement process.
Section 6. Guidelines and Agency Procedures
(a) After conducting public hearings the [Governor] shall issue Guide-
lines through regulations implementing the provisions of this Act within
[90 days] after the effective date of this Act.
(b) The guidelines issued by the [Governor] shall specifically include:
(1) Interpretation of terms used in this act including criteria for
determining whether or not a proposed action [may be major
or] may have a significant effect on the environment with ex-
amples. Social and economic factors may be considered in
determining the significance of an environmental effect;
(2) On the basis of such criteria, identification of those typical
agency actions that are likely to require preparation of en-
vironmental impact statements;
(3) A list of classes of actions which have been determined not to
have a significant effect on the environment and which thus
do not require environmental impact statements under this act.
In adopting the Guidelines, the [Governor] shall make a find-
ing that each class of actions in this list does not have a signifi-
cant effect on the environment;
(4) The typical associated environmental effects, and methods
for assessing such effects, of actions determined to be likely
to require preparation of such statements;
(5) Procedures for obtaining comments on environmental impact
statements, including procedures for providing public notice
of agency decisions with respect to preparation of a draft en-
vironmental statement, or, in the case of major or controver-
sial actions determined not to involve a significant environ-
mental impact, procedures for announcing the decision that no
environmental impact statement will be prepared.
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